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Fabro is currently a research preview. It has not yet been subject to third-party penetration testing. There may be vulnerabilities. We strongly recommend only deploying Fabro on private, self-hosted resources within a controlled networking environment.

Security controls not in Fabro

Fabro is single-tenant software designed for small, trusted teams. The following controls are not implemented — plan your deployment accordingly.
ControlStatus
Multi-tenancyNot supported. Fabro is single-tenant only — there is no organization or tenant isolation.
Roles or ACLsNot supported. All authenticated users have identical, full access to every run, workflow, and API endpoint.
Rate limitingNot implemented. The API server does not throttle requests.
Security headersNot configured. The API does not set Strict-Transport-Security, Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, or similar headers.

Security recommendations

Network

  • Deploy the web app on a private network. Use a Tailscale tailnet, VPN, or internal network to keep the web UI off the public internet.
  • Deploy the API on a private network. Only allow access from expected hosts (the web app, CI runners, developer machines). The API binds to 127.0.0.1 by default — do not expose it with --host 0.0.0.0 unless it is behind a firewall or private network.
  • Use Daytona sandboxes with network controls. When running untrusted or generated code, use the Daytona sandbox provider with network = "block" or a CIDR-based allow list to restrict agent egress.

Authentication

  • Enable authentication. Fabro supports GitHub OAuth and Tailscale header-based auth for the web app. Do not use insecure_disabled outside of local development.
  • Configure a username allowlist. Both GitHub and Tailscale auth support allowed_usernames in server.toml. An empty allowlist rejects all requests.
  • Use JWT to connect the web app to the API. Configure FABRO_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY on the web app and FABRO_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY on the API server. JWT tokens are Ed25519-signed and short-lived (30 seconds).
  • Use mTLS for machine-to-machine API access. Configure [api.tls] in server.toml with server cert, key, and CA. Set client auth to Required for programmatic clients (CI, scripts).

Secrets

  • Keep API keys out of sandboxes. The local sandbox strips environment variables ending in _API_KEY, _SECRET, _TOKEN, _PASSWORD, or _CREDENTIAL, but Docker and Daytona sandboxes provide stronger isolation — only explicitly configured variables are passed through.
  • Use .env files for credentials. Fabro loads credentials from ~/.fabro/.env and the project-root .env. Do not commit these files to version control.
  • Rotate the session secret. The SESSION_SECRET environment variable encrypts web app sessions. Rotate it periodically and use a strong random value.

Execution

  • Use Docker or Daytona for untrusted workflows. The local sandbox offers no filesystem or network isolation — agents have the same access as the host. Use docker or daytona when running code you haven’t reviewed.
  • Restrict agent permissions. Use --permissions read-only or --permissions read-write to limit which tools agents can invoke without approval. In non-interactive mode (--auto-approve), tools outside the permission level are denied outright.

Security reporting

If you discover a security vulnerability in Fabro, please report it responsibly:
  1. Email security@fabro.dev with a description of the vulnerability, steps to reproduce, and any relevant details.
  2. Do not disclose the vulnerability publicly until we have had a chance to investigate and release a fix.
  3. We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to provide an initial assessment within 5 business days.
  4. We will work with you to understand the issue and coordinate disclosure timing.
We appreciate the security research community’s efforts in helping keep Fabro and its users safe.